This paper provides a rationale for intra-party democracy within a political agency model with moral hazard. The focus is on the party's internal procedures for policy determination. I show that democratizing those procedures bene…ts the party leadership, which seeks to maximize joint reelection chances of the party's incumbents. The reason is that under intra-party democracy, the voters adopt less demanding reappointment rules and reelect the party's incumbents more often than under leaders-dominated party structure. My results therefore indicate that democratizing policy determination processes within the party is in the interests of both the leadership and the ordinary members. The voters in turn are equally well o¤ regardless of the party's internal procedure for policy determination.
Introduction
line. Following Scarrow (2005) , I distinguish between a party structure with low levels of inclusiveness in decision-making processes (as in "leaders-dominated" parties, "parties of notables" or "cadre" parties) and that with higher inclusiveness levels (as in parties of "individual representation", "corporatist" parties, parties built on "basis democracy" or "mass" parties). In the context of the policy determination model under consideration, this suggests two options for the party internal structure. Under the …rst, labeled as leaders'dominance, ordinary party members are excluded from the agenda-setting process. The party leadership has the sole power to de…ne the party line. Under the second, labeled as intra-party democracy, ordinary party members take part in setting the party line. They actually exert costly e¤ort to bias the party agenda in favor of their preferred policies.
A representative voter in each district cares about implementation of a policy, which bene…ts his home district. Only the policy outcome is observed by the voter, not the corresponding policy weight. The voter realizes that whoever de…nes the party line cares about the incumbent's reelection and therefore can be held accountable for the policy outcome at the moment of election. I assume that the voter adopts a cuto¤ rule and reappoints the incumbent only when the corresponding policy outcome exceeds a critical threshold. Obviously, the voter might …nd it optimal to apply di¤erent thresholds for di¤erent internal structures of the party.
Indeed, in equilibrium, the voter is extremely demanding in the case of leaders-dominated party but much more tolerant in the case of intra-party democracy. Intuitively, the voter is rational, and so realizes that adopting a very demanding reappointment rule might become counterproductive under intra-party democracy. Indeed, the incumbents exert e¤orts to bias the party line in favor of their preferred policies. The e¤ort is costly, and so might not pay o¤ under very strict reappointment rules. Satisfying a very demanding voter actually becomes too costly for his representative in the congress, which leads to lower e¤ort levels, and therefore to smaller weight of the corresponding policy in the party line. The opposite is true in the case of leaders-dominated party. In this case the policy weights are assigned by the party leaders who care about the joint reelection chances of the party's incumbent congress members. The voters therefore have a certain degree of power over the party leadership-their wishes have to be satis…ed at least to some extent to guarantee non-zero joint probability of reappointment. The more demanding the voter in a particular district, the greater weight the party leaders assign to a corresponding public policy to ensure at least some chance of winning this district in the coming election.
While the voters apply di¤erent reappointment thresholds for di¤erent internal structures, in equilibrium all policies are included in the party line with equal weights regardless of the party structure. 1 Indeed, in the case of intra-party democracy, congress members exert equal e¤orts to bias the party line in favor of their preferred policies, which results in equal policy weights in equilibrium. In the case of leaders-dominated party, the party leadership tries to satisfy somehow voters'wishes in all districts to maximize the joint reelection chances of the party's incumbents, and so …nds it optimal to treat all the districts equally. Therefore, whoever determines the party line, the voters are equally well o¤. However, the …nal policy outcomes are more likely to pass a tolerant threshold required for the incumbents'reappointment under intra-party democracy rather than a strict threshold required for reappointment under leaders-dominated party structure. So the incumbent congress members have higher chance of being reelected under intra-party democracy, which convinces the party leaders to adopt more inclusive processes for setting the party agenda. Moreover, for the incumbents, the costly e¤ort pays o¤: the net gain in reelection probability exceeds the e¤ort cost.
I must stress that these results rest on the assumption that party leaders care about joint reelection chances of the party's incumbent congress members. If the party leaders pursue other goals (e.g., particular policy or rent-seeking) they might prefer to have the sole authority to determine the party line rather than adopt democratic decision-making procedures within the party.
The paper borrows from the literature on political agency, starting with the seminal work of Barro (1973) and followed by Ferejohn (1986) , Persson et al. (1997) , Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) , Sundaram (1993, 1996) , and others. In this approach, elections are modeled as a disciplining device. Politicians want to be reelected for another term, and are held accountable for their past performance at the time of election. They therefore have incentives to satisfy the voters'wishes.
The paper is also related to the broad literature on decision making in committees (see The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 proceeds with the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 1 The results are symmetric owing to the symmetry of the problem. In subsection 3.3, I discuss the robustness of the results to non-symmetric speci…cations of the model.
Model
Consider a political party that holds a certain number of seats in the congress. I assume, for simplicity, that there are just two congress members a¢ liated with the political party. 2 The party leadership seeks to maximize the reelection chances of the party's incumbent congress members (like in Fréchette et al. 2008 ). The party leaders'objective is therefore to maximize the joint probability of partisan congress members being reelected to o¢ ce:
where P stands for probability and i denotes an event that the party's incumbent congress member i is reelected, i = 1; 2.
Congress members a¢ liated with the political party are assumed to be purely o¢ cemotivated, and so maximize their own reelection chances. Congress member i's objective function is
Congress member i represents the interests of her home district i. Think of these as local public goods or district-speci…c public projects. The party line (i.e., the party agenda) speci…es which of these district-speci…c public policies are in the interest of the party. I formalize the party line in terms of weights s i 2 [0; 1], P 2 i=1 s i = 1. Weight s i corresponds to a public policy bene…ting partisan district i and re ‡ects the degree of priority of this policy in the party's objectives. In extreme cases, s i = 0 means that the corresponding policy is not included in the party line, while s i = 1 means that it is the party's only objective.
The party leadership might apply di¤erent internal procedures to de…ne the party line. In particular, two opposite party structures are considered. Under the …rst, labeled as leaders' dominance, the party leadership has the sole authority to determine the party line, and so chooses weights s i to maximize its objective function. In this case, ordinary party members have no power to a¤ect the party agenda. Under the second, labeled as intra-party democracy, ordinary party members have a say in de…ning the party line. They actually compete to bias the party's objectives in favor of policies, which bene…t their home districts. This competition is formalized in terms of the Tullock contest (1980) such that weight s i , which corresponds to public policy i in the party line, becomes
where x i denotes an e¤ort congress member i exerts to in ‡uence the party line in favor of a public policy bene…ting her home district. The set of e¤orts available to each congress member is taken to be a non-degenerate interval [0; x] R where x is large. The cost of the e¤ort of congress member i is linear, x i . 3 To pass a district-speci…c public policy in the congress, the party support is to be ensured.
Indeed, the more the party members support a particular policy on the ‡oor of the legislature, the more likely this policy is to pass the congress and then to be implemented. 4 I assume that the party support is guaranteed for the policies included in the party line. Moreover, a policy with weight s i in the party line is assumed to obtain the party support of strength s i . 5 Then implementation of policy p i , which bene…ts district i only, is determined by the partisan support strength s i and an independent, unobservable noise " i :
where 2 (0; 1) and " i N 0; 2 . 6 The noise term " i is meant to represent all other factors apart from the partisan support, which a¤ect passage and implementation of a district-speci…c public project. 7 Consider now a representative voter in district i, who cares about the implementation of district-speci…c public policy p i . 8 Only the policy outcome p i is observed by the voter, not its 3 The qualitative results of the model hold for a convex cost function. A linear cost function is introduced in order to simplify the algebra. 4 It is important to point out that success of a particular policy in the legislature is not solely determined by legislative support of members of the corresponding party, but also the congress composition by party and voting patterns of other congress members. I want to concentrate, however, on intra-party rather than inter-party politics, and so focus the model on the party's internal functioning. . 6 The qualitative results of the model hold for a general concave function from si to pi. I introduce a functional form pi = s i + "i with 2 (0; 1) as it allows a closed-form solution. 7 An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the noise term "i follows a single-peaked symmetric distribution with increasing hazard function. The results of this extended model are qualitatively similar. 8 Since there is no ideological component, it is convenient to consider a single representative voter in each district.
composition between policy weight and noise. The voter realizes that whoever determines p i 's weight in the party line (party leadership in the case of leaders-dominated party or congress member i in the case of intra-party democracy) cares about i's reelection chances, and so can be held accountable for p i 's implementation at the moment of election. The voter is assumed to adopt a cuto¤ reelection rule: he reappoints an incumbent congress member if policy outcome p i exceeds a certain threshold, say i 2 [0; 1]. 9 Under this reelection rule, event i that the party's incumbent congress member i is reelected becomes
The probability of i being reelected is given by
where F denotes the normal distribution function. The joint probability of incumbent congress members being reelected to o¢ ce becomes
This is a sequential political agency game between politicians (party leaders and congress members) and representative voters (one in each partisan district). The timing of events is as follows. First, the party leaders decide on the party internal structure: leaders'dominance or intra-party democracy. Second, the representative voter in each partisan district commits to the reelection rule to be used in the coming election, i.e., chooses reelection threshold i . Third, the party line is de…ned either by the party leaders (under leaders-dominated party structure) or by the congress members in a competitive contest (under intra-party democracy). Finally, nature chooses noises " 1 and " 2 , and the policy outcomes p 1 and p 2 are observed. The election takes place and the representative voter in each district applies the selected reelection rule to reward the incumbent congress member.
I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game backwards. First, given the party internal structure and reelection thresholds i 2 [0; 1], I examine the choice of the party line. Second, given the party internal structure, I solve for the voters' decision regarding reelection thresholds. Finally, I analyze the party leaders' choice of the party internal structure. 9 The voter is rational, and so realizes that the expected policy outcome Epi will not exceed 1, i.e., Epi 2 
Analysis
In this section, the game is analyzed backwards to …nd a subgame perfect equilibrium. I consider the politicians'and voters'decisions under leaders'dominance …rst, and under intraparty democracy second. I turn then to the party leaders'decision regarding the party internal structure.
Leaders-Dominated Party
Under leaders-dominated party structure, the party leaders have the sole authority to de…ne the party line. Given the reelection rules with thresholds 1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1], the party leadership chooses policy weights s 1 and s 2 in the party line to maximize its objective function:
with s 1 + s 2 = 1. The party leaders'maximization problem is analyzed in the Appendix. I
show that the second-order condition holds for all reelection rules with thresholds 1 2 [0; 1] . The joint probability of incumbent congress members being reelected to o¢ ce under leaders'dominance, denoted by P L \ 2 i=1 i , is given by
According to Proposition 1, under leaders-dominated party structure, the representative voter in district i applies the strictest possible reelection threshold: L i = 1. Why does the voter adopt such strict reelection rules? The voter is rational, and so realizes that the party leaders have to satisfy his wishes, at least to some extent. Indeed, the party leadership seeks to maximize the joint reelection chances of the party's incumbent congress members, and so has to please a representative voter in each district somehow. Otherwise, the joint probability of all congress members being reelected drops down sharply. The voters therefore have a certain power over the party leadership-whatever they demand has to be satis…ed to some extent to guarantee non-zero joint probability of reelection. Then, the stricter the reelection rule in each district (i.e., the more demanding the voter), the greater weight the party leaders assign to a corresponding policy in the party line to ensure at least some chance of an incumbent being reelected in this district. The voter therefore tends to be as demanding as possible. However, the party leadership is not able to satisfy all voters entirely. Indeed, pleasing the voter in one district implies disappointing the voter in the other district. The party leadership manages to …nd a compromise, i.e., to satisfy both voters to some extent ensuring some chances of both incumbents being reelected. In equilibrium, all public projects are included in the party line with equal weights, s 1 = s 2 = 1 2 . (The policy weights are equal owing to the symmetry of the problem.) The expected policy outcome in district i does not reach the reelection threshold: Ep i < L i . As a result, the incumbent congress members are more likely to be thrown out of o¢ ce. There is, however, some chance of both incumbents getting reelected. This happens when a realization of noise " i is positive and su¢ ciently large in each district, i.e., " i L i
Ep i for i = 1; 2. The probability of this is strictly less than 1 4 , and so is the probability of both incumbents being reelected under leaders' dominance:
Intra-Party Democracy
In the case of intra-party democracy, congress members de…ne the party line in a competitive contest. Each congress member exerts a costly e¤ort x i to in ‡uence the party line in favor of a public policy bene…ting her home district. 10 Given the reelection rules with thresholds i 2 [0; 1], congress member i chooses an e¤ort x i 2 [0; x] to maximize her reelection chances net of the e¤ort cost: . The joint probability of incumbent congress members being reelected to o¢ ce under intraparty democracy, denoted by P D \ 2 i=1 i , is given by
Under intra-party democracy, the voters are not so demanding as under leaders-dominated party structure. Indeed, the equilibrium reelection rules are rather tolerant: D i = 1 2 < 1. Intuitively, the voter's goal is to motivate his representative in the congress to exert e¤ort to bias the party line in favor of the voter's preferred public project. If the voter is absolutely not demanding and always reelects the incumbent, the latter has no incentive to work hard in the congress. Then, the more demanding the voter (i.e., the stricter the reelection rules), the more incentives the congress member has to promote the interests of her home district and so the more e¤ort exerts. As a result, the corresponding public policy gets the greater weight in the party line. However, the e¤ort is costly, and so might not pay o¤ under very strict reappointment rules. Indeed, satisfying a very demanding voter becomes too costly for his representative in the congress, which leads to lower e¤ort levels, and therefore to smaller weight of the corresponding policy in the party line. It follows that the policy weight is initially increasing and then decreasing with a reelection threshold applied in the corresponding district. The voter therefore adopts a reelection threshold of intermediate value, which maximizes the weight of his preferred policy in the party line. Thus, under intraparty democracy, the equilibrium reelection rules tend to be less strict than under leaders' dominance. The incumbents can meet the voters'wishes in this case. In equilibrium, all public projects are included in the party line with equal weights and the expected policy outcomes reach the thresholds required for reelection in each district: Ep i = D i . Each incumbent therefore has equal chance of being reelected or thrown out of o¢ ce. A positive realization of noise " i pushes the policy outcome over the required threshold and therefore implies reelection of the incumbent. In turn, a negative realization of noise drags the policy outcome down and leads to the incumbent's dismissal. The joint probability of both incumbents being reelected, outcome p i and corresponding policy weight s i more linear (and less concave). As a result, the reelection probabilities become more sensitive to e¤ort, increasing the incumbents'incentives.
Choice of the Party Internal Structure
I turn now to the leaders'choice of the party internal structure. The party leadership seeks to maximize the joint reelection chances of the party's incumbent congress members. The joint probability of the incumbents being reelected is higher under intra-party democracy than under leaders'dominance:
which drives the following result.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium internal procedure to de…ne the party line is intra-party democracy. The equilibrium reelection thresholds, congress members' e¤orts and policy weights are given in Proposition 2.
At …rst glance this result seems counterintuitive. Indeed, why would the party leaders let ordinary members determine the party line instead of choosing it themselves? Intuitively, the party leaders realize that if they were the ones de…ning the party line, they would face very demanding voters. The voter in each district would actually adopt the strictest possible reelection rule to motivate the party leaders to make his preferred policy the party's only objective. And the party leaders in this case would have to meet the voters' requirements somehow, in order to guarantee some positive chances of the incumbents being reelected in all districts. However, none of the voters could be completely satis…ed as all public policies would be included in the party line with equal weights. As a result, the incumbent congress members would be more likely to be thrown out of o¢ ce rather than reelected. The party leaders therefore prefer to let ordinary members de…ne the party line in a competitive contest, as in this case each congress member has equal chance of being reelected or dismissed. Intuitively, the voters realize that biasing the party line in favor of their preferred policies is costly for the incumbents and might not pay o¤ under very demanding reappointment rules. As a result, the voters are quite tolerant. Satisfying their realistic demands is feasible. In equilibrium, the incumbents exert equal e¤orts, and so all policies have equal weights in the party line and get equal support on the ‡oor of the legislature. The expected policy outcomes reach the thresholds required for reappointment. The reelection outcome for each incumbent is therefore determined solely by a realization of the noise, and so has equal chance of being favorable or unfavorable. The incumbents are thus more likely to be reelected under intraparty democracy than under leaders-dominated party structure. Moreover, their costly e¤orts …nally pay o¤. Indeed, the incumbents are better o¤ exerting costly e¤orts to determine the party line in a competitive contest under intra-party democracy rather than just accepting the agenda of the party leadership under leaders'dominance:
for the range of parameters of interest, i.e., for 2 > 4(1 ) with 2 (0; 1). (The proof of this is given in the Appendix.) I must stress that whoever determines the party line (party leadership in the case of leaders-dominated party or congress members in the case of intraparty democracy) assigns the same policy weights in equilibrium. The di¤erence between the two internal procedures is in the equilibrium reappointment rules adopted by the voters, which a¤ect the incumbents'reelection probabilities. So the ordinary party members are better o¤ under intra-party democracy not because of better policy outcomes but just because of less demanding voters. The voters in turn are equally well o¤ regardless of the internal procedure for de…ning the party line. Indeed, whoever determines the party line, each policy gets the same weight and the same party support:
The results presented here are symmetric owing to the symmetry of the problem. The model can be extended to consider agents with non-symmetric preferences and/or cost functions, or to assume non-symmetric relationships between policy weights and corresponding policy outcomes. Such extended model would obviously yield non-symmetric solutions for equilibrium policy weights and reelection thresholds. However, the voters would still be less demanding-and so more likely to reelect incumbents-under intra-party democracy than under leaders'dominance. The main message of the paper would therefore hold unless the party leaders were assumed to pursue other goals or favor a particular public policy rather than to maximize a joint probability of partisan congress members being reelected to o¢ ce. Indeed, if it were the case, the party leadership would not have to satisfy a representative voter in each district under leaders-dominated party structure.
Conclusion
This paper has provided a rationale for intra-party democracy within a political agency model with moral hazard. I focus on policy determination procedures within the party and show that democratizing those is in the party's interest. The reason is that under intra-party democracy, the voters adopt less strict reappointment rules and reelect the incumbents more often than under leaders-dominated party structure. The voters realize that very demanding reappointment rules become counterproductive under intra-party democracy, when the congress members exert costly e¤orts to bias the party line in favor of their home districts.
Very strict reappointment requirements demotivate the incumbents to make e¤ort in this case. In contrast, under leaders-dominated party structure, whatever reelection requirements the voters apply will be met to some extent since the party leadership wants to guarantee positive reelection chances of the party's incumbents in all partisan districts. The stricter the reappointment rules in a particular district in this case, the more weight the party leaders assign to the corresponding policy in the party line. Intuitively, the voters then adopt more demanding reappointment rules under leaders'dominance.
I must point out that the paper constitutes a partial attempt to justify intra-party democracy and focuses on a speci…c game within a political agency framework. It would be of interest to explore di¤erent game structures that might reveal further reasons for political parties to adopt more inclusive policy determination processes. Simplifying (A.1) yields an implicit solution for the party leaders'maximization problem:
B. Proof of Proposition 1
The representative voter in district 1 chooses 1 2 [0; 1] to maximize s L 1 , which satis…es (A.5). The voter then chooses 1 to maximize hazard function
for any 
Since for the normal distribution
Plugging L 1 = 1 and L 2 = 1 in (A.5) yields an implicit solution for the equilibrium policy weights in the case of leaders-dominated party, denoted by s 1 and s 2 = 1 s 1 : 
since the hazard function of the normal distribution is increasing. Then the right-hand side of (B.1) is inferior to are the equilibrium policy weights under leaders-dominated party structure. The joint probability of incumbent congress members being reelected to o¢ ce, denoted by P L \ 2 i=1 i , is equal to
C. Congress Members' Maximization Problem under Intra-Party Democracy Given reelection threshold i 2 [0; 1], congress member i exerts e¤ort x i to maximize
The …rst-order condition with respect to
The second-order condition is
The last term of (C.2) is negative. The sign of the …rst term is exclusively determined by the sign of
Given i 2 [0; 1] and x i ; x j 2 [0; x] such that max fx i ; x j g > 0, the maximum of (C.3) is equal to 1 + 4 2 , which is negative for 2 > 4 (1 ) . Therefore the second-order condition (C. 2) holds for all i 2 [0; 1] and x i ; x j 2 [0; x] such that max fx i ; x j g > 0.
The assumption that the upper bound of the set of e¤orts, x, is large guarantees that the The equilibrium reelection threshold therefore becomes
The joint probability of incumbent congress members being reelected to o¢ ce, denoted by
Substituting equilibrium thresholds D i into the …rst-order conditions (C.1) yields congress members'equilibrium e¤orts under intra-party democracy, denoted by x i , i = 1; 2:
Finally, the participation constraints of the congress members are satis…ed:
1 2
x i 0 for 2 > 4(1 ) .
E. Proof of (3.1)
In the case of intra-party democracy, the incumbent's utility is given by her reelection probability net of e¤ort cost:
In the case of leaders-dominated party, the incumbent's utility is just her reelection probability:
I consider the di¤erence between the two and show that it is strictly positive for the range of parameters of interest, i.e., for 2 > 4(1 ) with 2 (0; 1). Indeed,
which is a continuous function of . Derivating with respect to yields Therefore,
for 2 (0; 1) and 2 > 4(1 ) .
